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In his discussion of the transition from the cinema of the movement-image to the cinema 
of the time-image, Deleuze famously makes way for the traumatic intrusion of history. 
This transition, he writes, is not purely internal to cinema, but the result of the emer-
gence of 
‘any spaces whatever’, deserted but inhabited, disused warehouses, waste ground, 
cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction. And in these any-spaces-
whatever a new race of characters was stirring, kind of mutant: they saw rather 
than acted, they were seers. (1989: xi) 
These spaces are the result of the destruction caused by the Second World War, creating 
new forms of anonymous or empty space: bombed cities, abandoned villages, the chaos 
of what Thomas Pynchon, in Gravity’s Rainbow, called “the zone” (1975: 281-616).1 It is 
these spaces, especially in Italian neo-realism, which will break up the movement-image 
and release “a little time in a pure state” (Deleuze 1989: xi). Due to the stark emptiness 
of these spaces and their anonymity, characters or images will no longer be embedded in 
movement but instead become detached into time. 
 This preamble is a way of saying that Deleuze’s essay “Postscript on the Societies of 
Control” (1992) is a traumatic intrusion into the body (or body without organs) of 
‘Deleuzianism’. It is the traumatic intrusion of a new or mutated regime of capitalism 
and power. This is an intrusion from the outside, or from history, but also one mediated 
by thought. It is perhaps more traumatic for that. It is not only that “history is what 
hurts” (Jameson 2002: 88), but history mediated or intensified by thought is more trau-
matic. It stands no longer as a potentially contingent intrusion but as an element of 
thought. This traumatic intrusion of history (and logic and programme – to use the 
terms of the essay) is folded into thought. The fold is not simply the baroque fold that 
                                                        
1 We might also think here of another ‘zone’. This is the ‘zone’ of Tarkovsky’s film Stalker (1979) and its 
source novel Roadside Picnic (1972), by Arkady and Boris Stugarsky. The zone, in this case, is the result of 
alien visitation, in the form of discarded technologies in a zone that might just be the result of the alien 
equivalent of a roadside picnic. This zone has become a ubiquitous trope, occurring in the work of M. John 
Harrison and Jeff VanderMeer. 
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Deleuze explored (1993), which would become the image for the neo-liberal adoption of 
Deleuzianism, especially in architecture (Spencer 2016). Instead, this is a fold that folds 
capitalism into conceptuality. The trauma is that the essay re-inscribes central concepts 
and tropes of Deleuzianism as crucial operators of the societies of control. What might 
have seemed to promise or prioritize resistance – as Deleuze said in his book on Fou-
cault: “resistance comes first” (1988: 89) – now seems to invert into its opposite. As in 
Nietzsche’s work, in which the highest sign of health could also be the sign of the worst 
illness, or vice versa, we enter into a strange zone of indistinguishability. 
 The concepts that we might have associated with the ‘positive’ Deleuzian project, its 
‘affirmationism’ (Noys 2010), are suddenly reversed by Deleuze. Modulation, fluxes, 
flows, and waves, after all “[e]verywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports” 
(Deleuze 1992: 6). These are now all forms of control. Similarly, with the dividual, this is 
not the anti-humanist dispersion of the self or ego, but the transformation of the indi-
vidual into “masses, samples, data, markets, or ’banks’” (Deleuze 1992: 5). Everything 
you might expect Deleuze to laud or love, especially if you had read Anti-Oedipus, now 
appears as part of the transformation of contemporary capitalism. The trauma is, due to 
Deleuze’s thinking, that this is not merely contingent, but integrated into the body of 
Deleuze’s thought. It is not by chance that Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts come into 
being in a way that now seems to match the societies of control, but by design. Deleuze 
does not shirk the difficulty of this proximity. 
 The essay itself is, of course, uncannily prescient. The regime of “universal modula-
tion” Deleuze (1992: 7) predicts has come to pass: a world of passwords, perpetual 
training, continuous control, and of the power of debt. All that is lacking are the “new 
weapons” Deleuze sought (1992: 4), unless we see those, as some do, in the new forms 
of amorphous and ‘suicidal’ struggles that mark the present moment (Clover 2016). Par-
ticularly uncanny is Deleuze’s suggestion that 
If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, it’s because they ex-
press the corporate situation with great precision. […] [T]he corporation constant-
ly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an excellent moti-
vational force that opposes individuals against one another and runs through each, 
dividing each within. (1992: 4-5) 
The fusion of game show and corporation is now evident in The Apprentice and then the 
fusion of that with the state with Donald Trump. The contours of Deleuze’s analysis now 
appear to be fully realised as the tendencies of our present. What we have to look for-
ward to, it seems, is an intensification of control that has already been laid out by 
Deleuze. 
 The very success of the analysis is, however, what produces the traumatic effect. 
This is the disturbing thing. Deleuze and Guattari’s (whose role should not be forgotten 
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or minimised)2 intuition and conceptualisation places them very close to the mutations 
of contemporary capitalism. What is the tracing of a diagnosis can come to appear as the 
disease. The language of Deleuze and Guattari, their imagery, which tries always to pro-
duce the real, is in danger of being realised in the real as the society of control. Their 
own desire to collapse metaphor into the real (Deleuze/Guattari 1983: 1), their own 
hostility to the mediation of the signifier,3 leads to an immanence of the theory that is 
coterminous with the capitalist real. What is the source of power is also the source of 
risk. Deleuze and Guattari appear as the thinkers of our moment, but also might come to 
coincide with that moment. The very predictive power to analyse control might, in some 
uncanny way, even risk conjuring that society of control.4 
 Of course, the Deleuzian will have easy answers to this. If Anti-Oedipus takes risks 
then the gains of resonance and prescience are worth the cost. A closer reading of the 
text, rather than extracting some of the more memorable slogans, would suggest the 
complexity of that text. Even if we admit there are problems, then so do Deleuze and 
Guattari. In particular, in A Thousand Plateaus and What Is Philosophy?, the risks of a 
‘bad’ reading of desire and of ‘absolute deterritorialization’ are explored and countered. 
It is not a matter of the ‘accelerationist’ desire (Noys 2014) to crash through the limits 
and immerse in the real. Instead, as Deleuze and Guattari say in A Thousand Plateaus, the 
production of a body without organs is to be done with “a very fine file”, not a sledge-
hammer (1988: 160). Again, in A Thousand Plateaus, they insist that “[s]taying stratified 
is not the worst that can happen” (1988: 161) and urge us to “[n]ever believe a smooth 
space will suffice to save us” (1988: 500). These multiplying cautions suggest the need to 
carefully distinguish Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual terminology from its seeming 
similarity to forms of capitalism. Of course, there is a truth to this proximity, Deleuze 
and Guattari are concerned to develop an analysis of the tendencies of capitalism, and so 
they must stay close to it, but they also must not be mistaken for it. We could also turn to 
                                                        
2 Deleuze notes that “Felix Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, 
one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but 
the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the 
barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position – licit or illicit – and effects a universal modu-
lation” (1992: 7). 
3 The preference is for Hjelmslev, who for Deleuze and Guattari is the linguist of language as immanence 
and hence has created “the only linguistics adapted to the nature of both the capitalist and the schizo-
phrenic flows: until now, the only modern – and not archaic – theory of language” (1983: 243). 
4 This was a risk Burroughs was well aware of. Burroughs’s cut-up and fold-in methods placed themselves 
close to magic and, for Burroughs, had predictive and conjurational power. This problem of the writer 
predicting or bringing about the future they are attempting to warn about is also pursued by the writer 
Iain Sinclair, influenced by Burroughs, who writes “by writing it he causes it to happen” (2004: 51). We 
could also trace this problem through Deleuze’s invocation of the ‘powers of the false’ in cinema (1989: 
126-55) and Deleuze’s discussions of trance and myth in the same work. Finally, this situation was formal-
ised by the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU) as ‘hyperstition’, a ‘practical fiction’ designed to ‘col-
onize the future, traffic with the virtual, and continually re-invent itself’ (2015). While seemingly emanci-
patory, not least from the notion of ‘truth’, the risk of this politics of prediction and performative myth is 
the lack of rationality. Recent manipulations by state actors, quasi-state actors and various groupings of 
the extreme right, have shown the risks of the ‘powers of the false’ and various hyperstitions. 
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Deleuze’s earlier articulations of the virtual and the actual (1991, 1997), which are both 
‘real’, as ways of complicating the seeming collapse of metaphor into the real (or Lacani-
an Real) that we seem to find in Anti-Oedipus. That is to say that there are conceptual 
resources in Deleuze to resist the mapping or collapsing of his thought into identity with 
contemporary capitalism. The difficulty that remains concerns the strength of these re-
sources as points of resistance and the dangers involved in this proximity to capitalism 
qua ‘real’. 
 The other difficulty is that this multiplication of nuance does not always appear to 
be conceptually integrated into Deleuzianism. The trauma of the “Postscript” remains 
because this identity of Deleuzian operators with the operators of control was not fully 
worked-through. Instead, the calls to caution can seem like arbitrary and even moralistic 
impositions on the flows of deterritorialization, a point made by Nick Land (2012: 277-
81). I am not endorsing Land’s aim to push things further beyond what he regards as the 
dangerous risk that “the tawdry pact between the preconscious and the superego that 
has dominated socialism since its inception would be reinstated at the heart of a – now 
wholly spurious – schizophrenic neonomadism” (2012: 281). Land’s hostility to the left 
would develop, first, into the embrace of deterritorialization as realised by authoritarian 
capitalism, in the form of China, and, second, into the vicious ‘return’ of reterritorializing 
forms of racial classification and racism to organise this capitalist delirium. Instead, the 
trauma remains. Land’s solution, the contours of right and reactionary accelerationism, 
is to sheer off any holding back and accept the identification of deterritorialization with 
‘universal modulation’. In this way trauma is denied or displaced into the shattering of 
the subject itself, which is always observed from a distance as it is melded within the 
capitalist sensorium. ‘New weapons’ are abandoned, or become forms of absolute identi-
fication. 
 Certainly, Land’s is an unusual and dissident Deleuzianism, not representative of the 
major trends of response to Deleuze’s thought. Land’s own literalisation of Deleuze re-
mains, however, disturbing. If Land identifies Deleuze with capitalism, we also have 
those who try to return Deleuze to a negativity that might break this relation: the “dark” 
(Culp 2016) or “negative” Deleuze (Toscano 2008). They seek again those moments 
within the body of Deleuzianism that shake it lose from what Foucault called a “happy” 
positivism (2002: 141). My preference is for the second, which is salutary and often con-
vincing. I do not think, however, that such readings can deny the final point and princi-
ple of affirmation for Deleuze, which is the power of life. Resistance comes first, as we 
noted, because the insurgent power of life comes first or, which amounts to the same 
result, is what remains. The fundamental affirmation of the power of life is what is sup-
posed to resist control, while, again, the biopolitics of control works exactly on the con-
cept of life. We are called to put our faith in an ‘excess’ of life over any mode of determi-
nation. No matter how ‘dark’ or ‘negative’ Deleuze is, this faith seems to remain. Even if 
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Deleuze’s is an expanded concept of life, one that integrates the technological and ma-
chinic, it is still affirmed as the point or place of escape. 
 That contemporary life continues to instantiate a biopolitics, in whatever form, is 
widely attested. Again, Deleuze and Foucault were prescient analysts of the emergent 
order, if both in seemingly peripheral texts – Deleuze’s essay on control societies and 
Foucault’s lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics, which might better be titled The Birth of 
Neoliberal Biopolitics (2004). The insistence on the insurgent value of life risks the same 
re-stating of the problem we have already traced: life is ‘perpetually’ resistance, but also 
‘perpetually’ captured or controlled. Modulation is, precisely, that ‘incitement’ or ‘in-
crease’ of life that constantly engages it within control. Of course, such claims can seem 
to be the very model of despair. In contrast, the ‘joy’ of life we find in Deleuze, although 
life in his texts is often associated with the most extreme ‘near death’ experiences of co-
ma and exhaustion (2001), is what immunizes us against modulation. If we assert that 
life is ‘captured’ by modulation we appear to give up any hope of resistance. To be a crit-
ic of Deleuze is to face the trap of being regarded as a pessimist who cannot see ‘new 
weapons’ but only the forces of control. 
 This is a risk to be run, because I would suggest the seeming ‘joy’ or ‘happiness’ of 
Deleuze, or variants of Deleuze, comes at the cost of dogmatic insistence that ‘life will 
find a way’ – precisely the point at which a metaphysics of resistance encounters a pro-
to-capitalist metaphysics of complexity that denies rational organization or structure. 
Jurassic Park standing as much for the insurgence of market forces as the insurgence of 
‘life’ – perhaps evident in the comedy of the repeated sequels in which the scale of the 
problem does not prevent another entrepreneurial attempt at ‘capture’. Life, and box 
office, finds a way. So, while apparently always instantiating the resistant powers of life, 
this thinking, to my mind, remains within a circle in which that ‘productive’ power of life 
serves a cycle of capitalist production – something Deleuze and Guattari were well 
aware of, and hence Deleuze’s admirable sobriety in his thought. 
 I want to conclude by offering some remarks that do not amount to a solution or a 
‘saving’ of Deleuze – not even in that mode of the American military in which saving is 
equivalent to destroying. The difficulty, I think, lies in the potential schematic nature of 
the abstraction ‘control’ in opposition to the abstraction ‘life’. This is not to simply con-
demn abstraction, nor offer a more complex critique of abstraction, of the kind found in 
Bergson (Deleuze 1991). Instead, I think that while control offers insight and depth of 
analysis that gives Deleuze’s text its prescience, it also risks condensing a whole series of 
phenomena into one concept. Life, on the other side, is also too abstract a concept, even 
if it is, for Deleuze, a concept that is most concrete. Instead, I would suggest we integrate 
the analysis of capitalism found in Anti-Oedipus, especially those elements that probe the 
density and opacity of capitalist forms. Contrary to the ‘accelerationist’ elements and 
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tendencies that can be used to characterize that text, we should also note the analysis of 
money and debt that will be mentioned in the societies of control essay and taken up 
most recently by Maurizio Lazzarato (2012). This might also engage the ‘problems’ of 
the virtual and the actual, in terms of the actualization of ‘tendencies’ of capitalist pro-
duction and a ‘rectification’ of problems (Deleuze 1997: 208). 
 The advantage of returning to Anti-Oedipus, problematic as I find it, is integrating 
again and in more detail the analysis of capital into our theoretical and critical work. 
This, I think, would nuance and deepen the analysis of ‘control’ into something more 
substantial, especially as a phenomenology of contemporary capitalism. This is to en-
gage with the dual problems of reification and personification as ‘legal categories and 
social correlatives’ (Rose 2017: 58). On the other side, the side of life, this concept would 
need to be analyzed with, and beyond, some of its problematic vitalist elements. This is 
not a matter of abandoning life. That would be to leave life as subject of capitalism. It is 
not, however, enough to assume life will always escape or ‘find a way’. In a sense, the 
‘exhausted’ examples of life that Deleuze (2001) deploys speak more to Agamben’s no-
tion of ‘bare life’ (1998) than they do to celebrations of its power. Once again, we might 
place this notion of exhaustion in the biopolitics of our moment – ‘sleepless’ (Crary 
2014) and ‘fatiguing’ (Rabinbach 1990). Therefore, as usual, we have not finished read-
ing Deleuze. The essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control” places us into a zone of 
trauma, for us and for Deleuzianism. That zone, however, is where we live. Hence, to re-
turn to that essay is to return to unravelling and working with the central concepts of 
Deleuze, notably ‘control’ and ‘life’, even if we work against them. In this way, in this 
zone of trauma, we might start to find ‘new weapons’, or the ways towards them. 
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